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(1) the collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data; (2) the
selection, coordination, and
arrangement of those materials; and (3) the creation,
by virtue of the particular
selection, coordination, or
arrangement, of an "original" work ofauthorship. Id.
The Court noted that the first and
third elements were self-explanatory. The key issue was found in the
second element: "whether the selection, coordination, and arrangement
are sufficiently original to merit protection." Id. at 1294. The Court
noted that the language, "in such a
way," suggested that some compilations would be copyrightable while
others would not. Id. Relying on
precedent, the Court justified that
every clause and word of a statute
should be given effect. Id. (citing
Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
1032 (1991».
The Court held that alphabetizing surnames for white pages did
not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection and was "devoid of even the
slightest trace of creativity." Id. at
1296. The selection of surnames,
the Court found, was obvious and
"lacks the modicum of creativity
necessary to transform mere selection into copyrightable expression."
Id. Moreover, Rural did not "select" to publish the surnames in its
directory, but was required by state
statute to publish the names and
telephone numbers of its subscribers. !d. at 1296-97. Lastly, the
Court noted that alphabetizing by
surname was "an age-old practice,
firmly rooted in tradition and so
commonplace that it has come to be
expected as a matter of course." Id.
at 1297.
The Supreme Court's holding in
Feist allows publishers ofwhite page
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listings to pilfer from theircompetitors simply because the surnames
were alphabetized, thereby lacking
originality. Although Feist and
Rural made their profit exclusively
from yellow page advertisements,
many other directories exist where
the publishers profit solely from the
directories themselves. Knowing
that a rival may simply reproduce
and profit from one's compilation
may result in publishers engaging in
other forms of publication which
are less vulnerable to piracy by competitors.
- Kimberly A. Doyle
Harmelin v. Michigan: MANDATORY SENTENCE OF
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
DOES NOT VIOLATE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT.
In the plurality opinion of
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct.
2680 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory
sentence of life in prison withoutthe
possibility of parole did not violate
the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. In its analysis, the Court
reviewed the history of the Eighth
Amendment in order to determine
whether a mandatory sentence could
be imposed without considering
mitigating factors. The Court refused to extend the so-called "individualized capital-sentencing doctrine" to cases other than those imposing the death penalty.
Ronald Harmelin was convicted
of possessing 672 grams ofcocaine.
Although Harmelin had no prior
convictions, he received a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole pursuant to Michigan law. The Michigan
Court of Appeals reversed
Harmelin's conviction on the
grounds that evidence in support of
the conviction was obtained in violation of Michigan's Constitution.

On petition for rehearing, however,
the court of appeals vacated its reversal and affirmed HarmeIin's sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court
denied leave to appeal, and the
United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
Harmelin set forth two reasons
that his sentence was unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. First,
Harmelin contended that the sentence was unconstitutional because
the punishment was significantly
disproportionate to the crime committed. Id. Second, Harmelin argued that the sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment because it was
mandatory, and therefore, precluded
the trial judge from considering any
particular circumstance of the crime
and the criminal. Specifically,
Harmelin contended that it was cruel
and unusual to impose such a severe, mandatory sentence as life
imprisonment without considering
mitigating factors.
To begin its analysis, a plurality
ofthe court held that "[slevere, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but
they are not unusual in the constitutional sense .... " The Court noted
that our nation's history has long
provided examples of mandatory
penalties, including death sentences.
Id. The Court reasoned, therefore,
that a sentence which was not otherwise cruel and unusual did not become such simply because it was
mandatory. Id.
The Court then considered
whether the Eighth Amendment required an individualized sentencing
determination that the punishment
imposed be appropriate to the crime
committed. Id. The Court noted
that such an individualized sentencing determination was, in fact, applicable in capital cases, and imposition of the death penalty without

this individualized sentencing determination was cruel and unusual
under the Eighth Amendment. Id.
The Court refused, however, to extend this individualized sentencing
determination beyond capital cases.
Id. at 2702.
The Court reasoned that the death
penalty "differs from all other forms
of criminal punishment, not in degree, but in kind. It is unique in its
total irrevocability." Id. (quoting
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
306 (1972». The Court explained
that even with a sentence of life
without possibility of parole, there
still existed possibilities of executive clemency and legislative reduction of sentences to take effect retroactively. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at
2702. The Court further noted that
the following sentences could produce only negligible differences: life
with parole eligibility in twenty
years, long-term sentences without
eligibility of parole for a 65-yearold man, and a life sentence without
parole. Id. The Court reasoned that
regardless of the difference, no sentence could be compared with death,
and, thus, the Court refused to expand individualized sentencing beyond capital cases. The Court held,
therefore, that a mandatory sentence
of life in prison without the possibility of parole did not violate the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment.
In a strong dissent, Justice White
asserted that while the Eighth
Amendment contained no specific
language as to a proportionality requirement, it did forbid excessive
fines. Id. at 2709. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White noted that it
would not be unreasonable to find
that excessiveness should be measured according to the crime committed, concluding that imposing
any punishment disproportionate to
the crime committed would be a

violation
of the
Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual
punishment clause. Id. Justice White
reasoned that "[t]he death penalty is
appropriate in some cases and not in
others. The same should be true of
punishment by imprisonment." Id.
at 2712.
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court found that a mandatory
sentence did not automatically become cruel and unusual by virtue of
its mandatory nature. The Court
distinguished capital cases, where
an individualized sentencing determination is mandatory, from all other
forms of punishment, where such a
determination is not required. Thus,
the Court refused to extend the individualized capital sentencing doctrine beyond death penalty cases. In
so doing, the Court gave great latitude to state legislatures for determination ofreasonable punishments
while usurping a sentencingjudge's
ability to consider any mitigating
factors the defendant may wish to
present.
- Ellen Poris

of whether due process acts as a
check on undue jury discretion to
award punitive damages in the absence ofany express statutory limit.
Lemmie L. Ruffin, Jr. was a licensed agent for both Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company (Pacific Mutual) and Union Fidelity
Life Insurance Company (Union).
After selling an insurance package
to the respondents, both employees
of an Alabama municipality, Ruffin
misappropriated premiums paid to
him by respondents' employer for
payment to Union. This caused
respondent's health insurance to
lapse without their knowledge.
In May 1982, respondents filed
an action in state court claiming
fraud by Ruffin and seeking to hold
Pacific Mutual liable under a theory
of respondeat superior. Following
the trial court's charge on liability,
the jury was instructed that if it
determined there was liability for
fraud, it could award punitive damages. The jury was further instructed
that the purpose of punitive damages was not to compensate the plaintiff, but rather to punish the defendant and deter him from doing such
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
wrong in the future.
Company v. Haslip: MASSIVE
Included among the damages was
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
a verdict for Respondent Haslip of
AWARD INTENDED TO
PUNISH AND DETER
over one million dollars. This sum
included a punitive damages award
WRONGDOERS IN CIVIL
more than four times the amount of
SUIT DID NOT VIOLATE
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE compensatory damages claimed.
OF THE FOURTEENTH
The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court and specifiAMENDMENT.
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance cally upheld the punitive damages
Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032(1991), award. The United States Supreme
the United States Supreme Court Court granted certiorari to review
held that a $1,040,000.00 punitive Pacific Mutual's claim that the pudamages award, which was more nitive damage award was the prodthan four times the amount of com- uct of unbridled jury discretion and
pensatory damages claimed, did not violative of its due process rights.
violate the Due Process Clause of
The Court first addressed the
the Fourteenth Amendment. After constitutionalityofthepunitivedamcircumventing the issue in the past, ages and outlined the common-law
the Court finally addressed the issue approach for assessing them. Under
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